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I. Introduction*
In retrospective, the sixties appear just like the "golden
age" of the West Germany economy. Growth rates were high and
stable, inflation was low, and unemployment was almost un-
known. This favourable macroeconomic performance was accom-
panied by rapid structural change that showed up in sub-
stantial shifts of output and employment between shrinking
and expanding industries. It is the central hypothesis of
this paper, that structural change in those days was not
just a by-product of strong growth, but rather the result of
a high adjustment flexibility, which was essential for
taking advantage of rich growth potentials.
In recent years, several attempts have been made in order to
identify possible determinants of the slowdown of economic
growth in West Germany and other industrial countries since
the early seventies. The most cited impediments to faster
growth in the seventies and eighties include the two oil-
price shocks, declining ratios of capital formation, ex-
hausted technological opportunities, increased real wage
pressure, monetary shocks, intensified competition from
abroad, and environmental restraints (for a survey see Bom-
bach, 1985; Maddison, 1987). It is increasingly recognised,
however, that the deterioration of economic performance
might also be attributed to changing institutional condi-
tions .
* This paper was presented at the seminar "Die sechziger
Jahre - Zeit des wirtschaftspolitischen Umdenkens", Kiel,
February 24-26, 1988. Thanks are due to helpful comments
from the participants, in this seminar.- 3 -
According to this view, the economic stability of the six-
ties gave rise to the establishment of powerful interest
groups, which increasingly objected to changes of relative
income positions and hence reduced the adjustment flexibi-
lity of the whole economic system (Olson, 1982; Giersch,
1985). Hence, obsolete activities were probably not aban-
doned quickly enough and the growth potential of promising
new activities were not fully exploited.
Successful lobbying of interest groups will in general show
up in policy measures supporting these groups. As was ana-
lysed elsewhere, the activities of sector-specific interest
groups in fact explain the sectoral pattern of internal and
external protection in West Germany (Witteler, 1986; Weiss
et al., 1988). The importance of the institutional hypothe-
sis can be evaluated, therefore, by an analysis of the
impact of industrial policy on structural change.
In recent years detailed statistical information on the sec-
toral structure of the West German economy and on government
interventions became available. The main sources are the
Federal Statistical Office and the economic research insti-
tutes engaged in periodical "reports on structural change"
(Strukturberichterstattung). In what follows, these data are
applied in order to examine the nature and significance of
the slowdown of structural change.
The paper is organised as follows. In section II the slow-
down of structural change in West Germany is described and
some possible determinants of this development are discus-
sed. Section III focusses on distortions in the direction of
structural change across different types of industries. In
section IV the impact of industrial policy on the speed of
structural change is analysed at a disaggregated level. In
the final section the consequences of reduced structural
change for aggregate employment are discussed.- 4 -
II. The slowdown of structural change in West Germany
At a sectoral level, structural change shows up in shifting
shares of output and factor inputs across industries. The
analyses presented in this paper are focusing on labour
input for the following reasons: Firstly, insufficient
adjustment of employment is closely related to the central
weakness of the West German economy - the stubbornly high
level of unemployment. Secondly, special attention shall be
paid to the implications of internal protection (government
subsidies) and external protection (trade barriers) for sec-
toral rigidities. These government interventions are pro-
tecting inputs, not outputs. Since the price of rather
immobile factors (labour) is in general more affected by
protection than the price of internationally mobile factors
(capital), government interventions will primarily result in
distortions of labour input (Basevi, 1966; Neary, Ruane,
1985).
In this context, structural change is defined as shifts of
employment shares between different industries. Its speed
will be measured by an indicator originally proposed by
Schiavo-Campo (1978) , which is nowadays applied in many
empirical studies (see, e.g., Lawrence, 1984; Donges,
2
Glismann, 1987) .It is calculated as follows:
SC = -i I | a
1 - a° |
2j i i i
where a. denotes the percentage share of industry i in total
employment, the superscripts 0 and 1 denote the beginning
and the end of period and j gives the number of years cover-
ed. This coefficient measures net annual shifts of employ-
A rudimentary description of this concept was already pre-
sented by Salette (1968).
2
Different concepts of measuring structural change were
extensively discussed at the beginning of the "Struktur-
berichterstattung" in West Germany (Breithaupt et al.,
1979; Krengel, Filip, 1981). See also Schatz (1974).ment between different industries as a percentage of total
employment.
Evidently, this concept is sensitive to the level of aggre-
gation. Comparing the speed of structural change in differ-
ent periods or different countries is impossible, therefore,
if the level of disaggregation is not held constant. More-
over, it seems appropriate to calculate this index for peak-
to-peak periods in order to avoid confusion of structural
trends and cyclical swings.
Within the system of West German national accounts, employ-
ment data for 50 different industries of the business enter-
prise sector are available since 1960. The speed of struc-
tural change can be calculated, therefore, for five complete
business cycles (table 1). Apparently, structural change was
much faster in the sixties than in the seventies and has
further slowed down in the eighties. With the declining
speed of structural change the average rates of output
growth also slowed down.
Table 1 - Structural change and output growth in West
Germany(a) 1960-1986


























Source: Statistisches Bundesamt(a); own calculations.- 6 -
Cross-country comparisons can reveal, whether the slowdown
of structural change is a common attribute of reduced econo-
mic growth. Actually, corresponding data for several OECD-
countries show a very similar pattern. The reduction of
output growth since 1973 was almost everywhere accompanied
by a slowdown of structural change (see table Al in the
appendix) .
Apparently, structural change and economic growth are mu-
tually interdependent. On one hand, there are several rea-
sons, why high rates of growth will bring about rapid
structural change. For example, income elasticities of
demand for different goods in general deviate from unity
(Engel-curve effects), the rate of technical progress is
uneven across industries (productivity bias), and the pos-
sibilities of adjusting to changing relative factor prices
2
are sectorally different (substitution bias) . In this con-
text, a limited potential of overall economic'growth will
reduce adjustment requirements.
On the other hand, structural change could also act as a
stimulus to economic growth. In open economies income oppor-
tunities are continuously shifting. Tastes of consumers are
not unaltered even at constant income levels, new competi-
tors are entering the market, and mature products are sub-
stituted by new ones. In general, a high degree of struc-
tural change is required in order to take advantage of new
growth potentials. In this view, insufficient adjustment
flexibility will reduce economic growth.
The alternative hypotheses, that the slowdown of structural
change since the early seventies has mainly been
Similar results for an international comparison of struc-
tural change and growth in the fifties and sixties are
presented in Schatz (1974).
2
On the impact of these biases on structural change see
Bhagwati (1977; 1984). For an empirical application to the
West German economy see Klodt (1988).- a consistent consequence of declining growth potentials,
or
- an important impediment to faster economic growth
are observationally equivalent. They differ, however, with
respect to sectoral adjustment requirements. If structural
change is rather a consequence of economic growth, the slow-
down of structural change would simply reflect a reduced
pressure for adjustment. If, however, economic growth is
hampered by insufficient sectoral flexibility, required
adjustments would exceed actual structural change.
At first glance, the pressure for structural change in the
West German economy appears to be much greater in the period
since 1973 than in previous years. The oil-price shocks of
1973 and 1979 have required sectoral shifts at the expense
of oil-intensive industries, the fierce competition from
Japan and from the newly industrialised countries of South
East Asia was concentrated on specific consumer goods indus-
tries, and extreme shifts of real exchange rates were alter-
ing the competitive position of industries producing trade-
ables against nontradeables industries. In addition, the
wage-push of the early seventies was most inflictive to
labour-intensive industries and the exposure to environ-
mental constraints was sectorally different .
This evidence suggests that the slowdown of structural
change resulted rather from artificial impediments to sec-
toral adjustment than from decreased pressure for structural
change. The importance of one of these impediments - govern-
ment protection - shall be analysed in detail. In the next
section, it is examined in which industries the slowdown of
adjustment is most distinct and to which extent these indus-
tries participate in government support.
These topics were discussed in detail in several reports
on structural change. See, e.g., Breithaupt et al. (1979);
Fels, Schmidt et al. (1981); Schmidt et al. (1984);
Schmidt, Gundlach, Klodt (1986); Donges, Schmidt et al.
(1988) .- 8 -
III. Distortions in the direction of structural change
Appropriate protection data are available for the "interna-
tional sector" of the West German economy, namely agricul-
ture, mining and manufacturing. With respect to adjustment
requirements, this sector is divided into three categories .
Industries of the first group (Schumpeter industries) are
characterised by a high level of human-capital intensity and
a high research intensity. These industries take advantage
of those production factors with which highly developed
economies normally are relatively well endowed. This group
includes chemistry and allied products, petroleum refiner-
ies, machinery, office equipment and computers, motor vehic-
les, aircraft and aerospace, electrical equipment, and
instruments. Production in the second group (Ricardo indus-
tries) is tied to specific areas because of the location of
natural resources or climatic and other regional properties.
This mainly applies to agriculture, mining, basic metals,
and shipbuilding. The remaining industries (Heckscher-Ohlin
industries) are either labour intensive or physical capital-
intensive .
In international perspective, a permanent shift of employ-
ment towards Schumpeter industries can be observed (Roth-
well, Zegveld, 1981, 1985; Freeman, Clark, Soete, 1982;
Lawrence, 1987). This not only applies to advanced indus-
trial countries, but also to many less developed countries,
especially to the dynamic region of South East Asia. A high-
wage economy like West Germany has to keep pace with this
development in order to avoid a deterioration of its rela-
tive and absolute income position (Krugman, 1979). Hence,
one would expect increasing shares of Schumpeter industries
and correspondingly declining shares of Ricardo and Heck-
For an extensive discussion of these categories see
Giersch (1978, 1979).
2
For a similar classification see Krieger, Thoroe, Weskamp
(1985) .- 9 -
scher-Ohlin industries. In the case of Ricardo industries,
the discovery of new deposits of natural resources and
improved production techniques abroad gave rise to further
comparative disadvantages of the West German economy in this
area. Moreover, these industries are facing a low income-
elastic demand.









(a) Percentage shares in total employment of agriculture, mining and manufacturing.
For each year, the shares of the three industry types add up to 100 percent.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (1987); own calculations.
Actually, sectoral shifts in West Germany were in accordance
with this pattern in the sixties and early seventies (figure
1). In the period following 1973, however, the relative
decline of Ricardo industries was almost stopped. The de-
cline of Heckscher-Ohlin industries, on the other hand, was
even more pronounced, which might primarily be attributed to
the increased real wage pressure since 1973/74. The shift- 10 -
towards Schumpeter industries, finally, was less distinct
than in previous years.
This evidence suggests, that the reduced speed of adjustment
in Ricardo industries plays a vital role in the overall
slowdown of structural change in West Germany. This develop-
ment did obviously not result from an improved competitive-
ness of these industries. On the contrary, the gap between
domestic production costs and world market prices in agri-
culture is continuously widening, profitable West German
coal deposits are almost exhausted, and in basic metals and
shipbuilding various highly competitive foreign producers
have entered the market .




















































(a) Subsidies as a percentage of net value-added.
(b) Agriculture, mining, manufacturing.
Source: Donges, Schmidt et al. (1988); Jiittemeier (1984);
Statistisches Bundesamt (1987); own calculations.
For a detailed analysis of the competitive position of
Ricardo industries in West Germany see Schmidt et al.
(1984).- 11 -
In fact, the conservation of Ricardo industries was mainly
achieved by government intervention. On the whole, these
industries are receiving about three quarters of all sub-
sidies which have been granted to agriculture, mining and
manufacturing, whereas their share in output and employment
of this sector is less than one quarter. And, more relevant
for structural change, the level of subsidisation of Ricardo
industries increased significantly since 1973. In agricul-
ture and mining, subsidy rates almost doubled; in basic
metals and shipbuilding they increased even more (table 2).
A quantitative assessment of the impact of industrial policy
on structural change requires a concept for the measurement
of distortions in labour input. In the next section, such an
approach is derived from the concept of effective protec-
tion.- 12 -
IV. Potential, actual, and repressed structural change
The effective rate of protection is defined as the ratio of
actual net value-added at domestic prices to net value-added
at world-market prices (Hiemenz, Hoffmann, Rabenau, 1971).
Protection rates do not indicate, of course, the definite
structure of output that would emerge in the absence of
protection. Such an analysis would require a sectorally
disaggregated general equilibrium model, which includes
supply and demand functions of domestic and foreign subjects
as well (Deardorff, Stern, 1985). Nevertheless, effective
protection is a well established and widely accepted concept
of measuring structural distortions in production.
Under two specific assumptions, these distortions are equi-
valent to distortions in employment. The first assumption is
an intersectoral wage-link. If the rates of change of nomi-
nal wages are equal in every industry, shifts in the sec-
toral structure of labour input are equal to shifts in
labour income. The second assumption is concerned to changes
of sectoral labour shares. If these rates of change are
identical across industries, shifts in the distribution of
labour income are equal to shifting shares of value-added.
This would point to sectorally invariant elasticities of
substitution, which might be attributed to an intersectoral
technology-link. As a consequence of the wage-link and the
technology-link, shifts in sectoral shares of output are
very similar to shifts in labour input.
The empirical validity of these assumptions was examined by
a correlation analysis. It covers 44 industries of the busi-
ness enterprise sector in West Germany . As information on
net value-added is not available for the whole period, the
The number of observations is determined by the availa-
bility of data on compensation of employees.b I b i I O
- 13 -
b I O i A fc ...
6e$ Instituts fur Weltwirtschaft
respective calculations refer to gross value-added. The
results presented in table 3 are highly supportive to the
assumption, that sectoral shifts in employment shares are
closely related to shifts in output .
Table 3 - Correlation of employment, compensation of





































Source: Statistisches Bundesamt(a); own calculations.
An appropriate data-base for estimating the sectoral struc-
ture of effective protection in West Germany was generated
by several research projects carried out at the Kiel Insti-
tute of World Economics. The results were published in
various studies: Comprehensive estimates of public aids by
industry since 1973 are presented in Jiittemeier (1984) and
Donges, Schmidt et al. (1988). Data on effective trade pro-
tection covering the period from 1958 to 1972 are provided
by Donges, Fels, Neu et al. (1973). And data on trade pro-
tection for more recent years are included in Weiss et al.
(1988) and Donges, Schmidt et al. (1988). In addition, the
This consistency of structural change in nominal output
and labour input is, by the way, a common result of empi-
rical studies concerned to the so-called three-sector
hypothesis. For the West German economy see, e.g., Fels,
Schatz, Wolter (1971), Donges, Klodt, Schmidt (1986). For
a survey of international studies see Norton (1986).'.M ->
- 14 -
latter publications provide estimates of total effective
protection resulting from both subsidies and trade bar-
riers .
In this paper data on total effective protection have been
calculated for the year 1973, which marks the end of the
period of rapid structural change in West Germany. These
calculations are derived from data for subsidies and net
value-added for the year 1973 and effective tariff rates for
1978. As nominal tariff rates imposed on West German imports
were almost unchanged between the Kennedy-Round and the
Tokyo-Round and sectoral input coefficients are rather
stable over time, the 1978 effective tariff rates probably
provide a suitable approximation of effective tariff rates
in 1973. Equivalently, total effective protection in 1984
was calculated from subsidies and net value-added of 1984
and effective trade protection of 1985. The figures are
shown in table A2 in the appendix.
Originally, the concept of effective protection was proposed
as a measure of allocative distortions in domestic produc-
tion. Due to the above described strong correlation between
changes in sectoral output and employment the concept can
also be used as an approximate measure of distortions in
labour input. As sectoral productivity levels differ, dis-
tortions of production and labour input are not equal. Dis-
tortions in output show up in a deviation of the actual out-
put structure from the structure of deflated output, where
the sectoral effective protection rates are the respective
deflators. In turn, the structure of employment "deflated"
by protection rates provides a measure of an undistorted
employment structure.
According to Corden (1971) total effective protection is
the sum of effective tariff protection and effective
internal protection. Internal protection is calculated as
the ratio of subsidies to net value-added at world market
prices.- 15 -
These data can be applied for an assessment of the impact of
industrial policy on the speed of structural change. For
this purpose, the sectoral distribution of employment in
1973 is compared to the structure of protection-adjusted
employment in 1984. The resulting Schiavo-Campo Index shows
potential shifts to an undistorted structure of labour in-
put. The difference between this index and actual structural
change indicates the extent to which sectoral adjustments
were repressed by means of industrial policy. Similar cal-
culations have been carried out for the period 1960 to 1973.
Apparently, structural change in the seventies and early
eighties was much more hampered by tariffs and subsidies
than in previous years (table 4). In absolute terms, the
amount of repressed structural change almost doubled; as
compared to potential structural change it increased from 17
to 44 percent.
Table 4 - Potential, actual and repressed structural change










(a) For the method see text. For the sample of




Source: As table 2.
It should be kept in mind, that these calculations only
refer to subsidies and tariffs as impediments to structural
change. It can not be concluded, therefore, that the whole
reduction of potential structural change is reflecting a
decrease of adjustment requirements. This reduction might
also be influenced by other impediments to structural change- 16 -
like restrictive labour market laws or shifts in the be-
haviour of unions and employer organisations. On the impor-
tance of these topics for labour markets in West Germany see
Donges, Schatz (1986); Burda, Sachs (1987); Soltwedel
(1987) .
As structural change slowed down in almost all industrial
countries (see table Al in the appendix), it was examined
whether the increase of subsidisation is also an interna-
tional phenomenon. For this purpose, the average share of
subsidies in gross national product was calculated for those
countries, for which data on structural change in the
periods before and after 1973 are available . Of course,
these subsidy rates are affected by many defaults, since in
national accounts statistics government subsidies are rather
narrowly defined. For example, they do not cover preferen-
tial tax treatments of R&D, of investment and the like. As
the systems of subsidisation differ between countries, an
international comparison of aggregated subsidy rates seems
inappropriate. With respect to the rates of change over
time, however, these data appear to be more reliable. As the
structure of the subsidy system within countries is in
general not subject to fundamental revisions, data derived
from national accounts probably provide suitable information
on changing intensities of government intervention in dif-
ferent countries.
According to these calculations, subsidisation was intensi-
fied in most countries in the seventies and early eighties
as compared to previous years (table A3 in the appendix). In
this respect, the West German economy is obviously no spe-
cial case.
International statistics on effective trade protection and
on the sectoral structure of subsidies are not available.
It can be expected, however, that increased aggregate sub-
sidy rates are in general associated with increased sec-
toral discrimination. According to Curzon Price (1981)
industrial policy measures are concentrated on Ricardo
industries in most industrial countries.- 17 -
It could be concluded, therefore, that the speed of struc-
tural change in the OECD area was substantially affected by
extended public aids to economically obsolete activities.
Evidently, a reduction of structural change by government
interventions will reduce aggregate output. Scarce produc-
tion factors are bound to inefficient industries and the
expansion of profitable industries is hampered. These inef-
ficiencies are equivalent to output losses. The consequence
of repressed structural change for total employment is less
obvious. In mainly depends on the flexibility of real wages.
This topic is discussed in the final section.- 18 -
V. Structural change and sectoral wage dispersion
The interdependence of structural change, wage dispersion
and selective protection can be illustrated in a two-sector
model of the labour market . Figure 2 presents labour demand
functions for an expanding industry (D ) and a shrinking
industry (D ) with the respective origins in 0 and 0
s e s
Total labour force is given by 0 0 . In the initial situa-
tion, labour demand is determined by D° and D° and full
e s
employment is achieved at a uniform wage level for both
sectors (w ).
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In the course of economic development, the labour
functions are assumed to shift from D° to D
1 and from D°
1 e e s




two different full employment equilibria are possible: Under
The graphical presentation of this model was originally
proposed by Mussa (1974). For an application to West Ger-
man labour markets see Burda, Sachs (1986).- 19 -
the assumption of sectoral flexibility in labour input
employment of the expanding industry will rise from 0 A to
0 B and employment of the shrinking industry will decline
from AO to BO . For simplicity, the equilibrium wage level
5 S
is assumed to remain constant at w . Under the alternative
assumption of extreme rigidities in labour input the expand-
ing industry is unable to attract any additional employees.
In consequence, wages in this sector will rise to w . In the
1
 e
shrinking industry, wages must fall to w in order to avoid
unemployment.
If real wages are equal to marginal productivity of labour
in each sector, the latter situation is obviously incompat-
ible with Pareto optimum. Due to the divergence of marginal
productivity in different sectors aggregate welfare is re-
duced. With respect to full employment, however, sectoral
wage dispersion and labour mobility are perfect substitutes.
The picture is different, if protective government interven-
tions and an intersectoral wage-link are taken into consi-
deration. Protection of the shrinking industry will result
1 1' in an upward shift of D , say to D . Due to budget con-
5 S
straints of government, an additional tax must be imposed on
the expanding industry in order to finance the subsidies,
thus the respective labour demand function is shifted from
1 1' D to D .If employees are unwilling or unable of sectoral
adjustments, employment of the expanding industry will
remain constant at 0 A and wages in this industry will rise
1'
 e
to w . With uniform wage contracts all over the economy,
w determines the wage level in the shrinking industry as
well.
As a result, real wages exceed their full employment level
and total employment is reduced. Under the specific assump-
tions of figure 2, the decline of employment in the shrink-
ing industry is even more pronounced than what would have
occurred under the conditions of no government interventions- 20 -
and adjustment flexibility of labour input. All in all, it
can be concluded that government protection is an inappro-
priate measure of compensating employment effects of in-
sufficient labour mobility. Unemployment resulting from
rigidities in labour input can only be avoided by a sectoral
dispersion of real wages. If the sectoral wage structure is
sufficiently flexible, on the other hand, no subsidies and
tariffs to shrinking industries are required in order to
maintain full employment.
In this view, structural unemployment is interpreted as un-
employment resulting from insufficient adjustments of the
sectoral structure of labour input and wages. This defini-
tion is much broader than the definition of most other
authors. In general, structural unemployment is measured by
discrepancies between unemployment and vacancies (Layard,
Nickell, Jackman, 1985; Franz, Konig, 1986; Jackman, Roper,
1987). In these studies, changes in structural unemployment
are identified by shifts of the "Beveridge-curve". Such
"mismatch-analysis" ignores, however, the impact of repres-
sed structural change on job offers in discriminated indus-
tries.
Evidently, some basic assumptions of the two-sector model
can be applied to the West German economy in the seventies
and eighties. As described above, government support is
heavily concentrated on declining industries (table 2). And
the sectoral wage structure was almost invariant since 1960
(table 3) . The growing importance of repressed structural
change was obviously not taken into account in wage con-
tracts .
For similar results on intersectoral wage differentials in
West Germany see Vogler-Ludwig (1985); Gundlach (1986).
For an international comparison of wage dispersion see
Blanchard et al. (1985); Klau, Mittelstadt (1985); Krue-
ger, Summers (1986); OECD (1987).- 21 -
In table 3, the intersectoral wage-link was calculated,
however, on a highly aggregated data base. Notably sectoral
differences in skills of employees were ignored. This ap-
proach was appropriate for an assessment of protective dis-
tortions in labour input. For an analysis of wage dispersion
a further disaggregation is required. Corresponding infor-
mation on wages by qualification levels of employees is
presented in table 5. In addition to total industry the
three most protected industries are considered (no skill-
specific data are available on wages in agriculture).
Industries facing a comparative disadvantage should pay
lower wages than others in order to stimulate voluntary
shifts of employment. As structural change slowed down since
the early seventies higher wage differentials were required
in 1986 than in 1973 . Actually, average wages in Ricardo
industries still exceed the wage levels in other industries.
The same applies to most skill and sex specific sub-groups.
Especially white-collar workers in mining are paid consider-
ably above average (for details see table A4 in the appen-
dix) .
Presumably, such wage contracts would have been impossible
without government support to declining industries. The
sheltered Ricardo industries in West Germany often are not
laggards, but leaders in wage bargaining. It can be argued,
therefore, that industrial policy in West Germany has con-
tributed to insufficient wage dispersion and increasing
structural unemployment.
For an assessment of interindustry wage dispersion and
labour mobility in the early sixties see Sachverstandigen-
rat (1965).- 22 -
VI. Conclusions
The evidence presented in this paper gives support to the
institutional hypothesis, according to which a substantial
part of the slowdown of structural change since the early
seventies can be attributed to successful lobbying activi-
ties resulting in sector-specific government support. Offi-
cially, industrial policy in West Germany is dedicated to
the reduction of frictional unemployment . In fact, this
policy yielded the opposite result. Massive government sup-
port to Ricardo industries could not prevent a decline of
employment in absolute terms. Instead, it reduced the ad-
justment flexibility of the whole economic system and gave
rise to a widening gap between potential and actual struc-
tural change.
Within the system of industry-specific government support,
trade protection is of reduced importance. Nowadays, the
conservation of declining industries is mainly pursued
through public subsidies. Most of these measures were al-
ready initiated in the sixties or even the fifties. For
instance, the first programme of government assistance to
shipbuilding was launched in 1962 and protection of agri-
culture dates back to the early fifties. In the aftermath of
1973, however, government interventions were significantly
intensified. On average, subsidy rates in Ricardo industries
almost doubled and sectoral shifts of labour input from
shrinking to expanding industries were increasingly repres-
sed. In consequence, industrial policy was reducing both
incentives for, and capabilities of, faster economic growth.
The principal design of sector-specific government mea-
sures is documented in Deutscher Bundestag (1968), which
is still the official guideline of industrial policy in
West Germany.- 23 -
The growing importance of repressed structural change would
have required higher intersectoral wage differentials in
order to avoid structural unemployment. But also the flexi-
bility of wages was reduced by industrial policy measures.
It can be argued, therefore, that aggregate unemployment
would presumably be lower in the absence of protective
government interventions.
This analysis is mainly concerned to the international sec-
tor of the West German economy. An extension to service
industries would require a different approach. In services,
public aids are in general of minor importance (with the
outstanding exception of rail transport). Instead, protec-
tion of services is achieved by a complex system of regula-
tions . In this case, protected industries are not prevented
from shrinking, but from expanding. As the share of services
in total employment will rise in the course of economic
growth (Kuznets, 1957, 1971; Chenery, 1960; Fuchs, 1981),
these regulations are hampering structural change as well.
Further research on government interventions and sectoral
rigidities should concentrate on this aspect of repressed
structural change.
For an extensive survey of regulations in West Germany see
Soltwedel et al. (1986) and Donges, Schatz (1986). For an
international comparison of regulations in service indus-
tries see GATT (1985).- 24 -
Table Al - Economic growth and structural change of employment in



















































































































































(a) Calculated for 8 sub-sectors for the business enterprise sector
according to the Labour Force Statistics of the OECD. - (b) Average
annual rate. - (c) 7 sub-sectors. - (d) Calculated from National
Accounts statistics.
Source: OECD (a, b, c); own calculation.- 25 -







































































































(a) Sum of effective tariff protection anc






































































































































































































I percentage share of subsidies in net value-
Source: Donges, Schmidt et al. (1988); Juttemeier (1984); Statistisches Bundesamt(a); own
calculations.- 26 -
















































































subsidies to gross domestic
Source: OECD(a); own calculations.- 27 -
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Hourly compensation of wage
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Source: Statistisches Bundesamt(b; c).- 28 -
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